Maschek v. State Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 38517 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
2-2-2012
Maschek v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 38517
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Maschek v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 38517" (2012). Not Reported. 184.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/184
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
SPENCER JAY MASCHEK, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NO. 38517 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
GREG S. SILVEY 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 565 
Star, Idaho 83669 
(208) 286-7400 
ATTORNEY FOR 
APPELLANT 
HONORABLE G. RICHARD J. BEVAN 
District Judge 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-2400 
ATTORNEY FOR 
RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................... 3 
ISSUE .................................................................................................................. 5 
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 6 
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Denied Post 
Conviction Relief Without Considering The Record Which 
Established Petitioner's Claims Of Ineffective Assistance 
Of Counsel, Or, In The Alternative, Petitioner Is Entitled 
To Post Conviction Relief Since His Attorney Failed To Move 
To Withdraw His Guilty Plea When He Did Not Receive Probation 
Despite The Court's Express Advice That He Could 
A. Standard of Review at Trial and on Appeal .......................... 6 
B. Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel ................................... 7 
C. Petitioner's Claims, the Change of Plea Hearing, 
and the Court's Rulings ........................................................ 8 
D. The Court Erred In Summarily Denying the 
Petition, or, in the Alternative, Mr. Maschek 
is Entitled to Post Conviction Relief .................................... 15 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 26 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .............................................................................. 26 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases: 
Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986) ................................................................. 7 
Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759 (Ct.App. 1991) ................................................ 6 
Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844 (Ct.App. 1994) .................................................. 6 
Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494 (Ct.App. 1994) ................................................... 6 
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319 (1995) .................................................... 7 
State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129 (1989) ......................................................... 7 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) .................................................... 7 
United States v. Buchanan, 59 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 1995) ................................. 17-18 
United States v. Lopez-Avila,_ F.3d _, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 624, 
(9th Cir. 1/12/2012) ................................................................... 22-23, 23-24 
Other Authorities: 
Idaho Code§ 19-4901 .......................................................................................... 6 
I.C.R. 11 .................................................................................................. 13, 19, 21 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Petitioner appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post 
conviction relief. In the underlying criminal case, Mr. Maschek entered an Alford 
plea to conspiracy to commit arson. The plea agreement provided that he would 
be placed in Mental Health Court, although if he was not accepted, the state 
would "limit itself to a period of retained jurisdiction, not actual penitentiary time to 
be served." 
At his change of plea hearing, the district court at first stated that if he was 
not admitted into Mental Health Court that he could not withdraw his guilty plea 
and that he would come back before the court "for sentencing and we look at 
some alternatives." 
Shortly thereafter, the court advised Mr. Maschek: 
... since this matter is presented to me as a Rule 11 plea 
agreement that I will honor the recommendations of the state to 
place you on probation. Do you understand that if for some reason 
something would come up and I would change my mind about that, 
that I would allow you to withdraw your plea of guilty? 
Transcript of Change of Plea hearing, 8/7/2008, p. 9, Ins. 3-8. (Exhibit on 
Appeal.) 
Later, Mr. Maschek was denied admittance to Mental Health Court 
through no fault of his own, and the court sent him on a rider and later 
relinquished jurisdiction. At no time did his counsel move to withdraw his guilty 
plea. 
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In his petition for post conviction relief, Petitioner alleged ineffective 
assistance of counsel for, inter alia, failing to move to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Despite the clear statement of the court described above, in its briefing and in 
oral argument on this issue, the state argued that Mr. Maschek was not entitled 
to withdraw his guilty plea and so his attorney could not be ineffective for failing 
to so move. Either due to negligence or by design, the state misrepresented the 
record by only quoting and discussing the earlier portion of the change of plea 
hearing supporting its argument and omitting the later portion which directly 
supported Petitioner's claims. 
The district court, presumably relying on the representations of the 
prosecutor rather than actually reading the entire transcript itself, simply 
accepted the state's argument and summarily denied the claim as unsupported 
by the record. Appellant asserts this was factually erroneous since the record 
actually proved Mr. Maschek's claim. 
Further, given the criminal court's express statements at the change of 
plea hearing, at the very least an evidentiary hearing was required to determine 
whether Mr. Maschek was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea under the 
circumstances of this case. However, Appellant alternatively argues that Mr. 
Maschek is actually entitled to relief as a matter of law because litigants should 
be able to trust the oral pronouncements of district judges, and, therefore, he was 
entitled to withdraw his guilty plea when he did not receive probation. 
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The facts and background of the underlying criminal case are explained by 
the state in its Statement of Claimed Uncontested Material Facts filed in 
conjunction with its motion for summary dismissal below. 1 
On February 25, 2008, a Red Honda Accord belonging to Spencer Jay 
Maschek was found burned in Devil's Corral in Jerome County. Mr. Maschek was 
contacted by police, and he reported that the vehicle was stolen. (R. p. 103.) 
On March 5, 2008, Mr. Maschek shot himself in the stomach and was 
thereafter hospitalized. (R. p. 104.) On March 6, 2008, he was charged with 
Conspiracy to Commit Arson. (R. p. 104.) 
A plea agreement was reached where he would enter an Alford plea and 
the state would recommend an eight year sentence with the first four years fixed, 
suspended if the defendant was accepted into Mental Health Court, with the state 
limiting itself to a retained jurisdiction and not actual penitentiary time to be 
served if he was not. (R. p. 105.) 
Mr. Maschek was ultimately denied entry into Mental Health Court 
because his major depressive disorder was being addressed successfully in the 
community. (R. p. 105.) The court sentenced him to eight years with the first 
four years fixed and retained jurisdiction. (R. p. 106.) At the completion of his 
rider, the APSI recommended that the court consider relinquishing jurisdiction, 
which the court did on June 1, 2009. (R. p. 106.) 
1 Appellant notes that appointed post conviction counsel did not file a statement 
of contested facts nor comment on the correctness of the state's claimed 
uncontested facts one way or the other. 
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Mr. Maschek appealed, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the 
sentence and relinquishment of jurisdiction. (R. p. 106-107.) 
Petitioner then filed a pro se 28-page verified petition for post conviction 
relief and supporting affidavit. (R. p. 4-32.) He also requested that counsel be 
appointed, and conflict counsel ultimately was. (R. p. 33-34, 45, 68, 70-72.) 
Appointed counsel filed what was entitled "Amended Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief." (R. p. 77-78.) This two page document did not actually 
change any claims, but instead expressly stated that it was concisely stating the 
grounds as alleged by Petitioner. (R. p. 77.) 
The state filed an answer and a motion for summary dismissal with 
supporting brief and a statement of claimed uncontested material facts. (R. p. 80-
82, 84-99, 101-102, 103-108.) The state also requested the court take judicial 
notice of many specific items from the criminal case (which it did).2 (R. p. 110-
112; Tr. 12/6/2010, p. 12-13.) 
The court held oral argument on the motion, although Mr. Maschek was 
not personally present. (R. p. 114-115.) The court rejected all of the claims and 
summarily dismissed the petition. An order prepared by the state was thereafter 
entered granting the state's motion for summary dismissal, which relied on the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law stated on the record at the hearing. (R. p. 
116-117.) 
Petitioner timely appeals. (R. p. 121.) 
2 The district court actually copied these items, and they appear in our record as 
exhibits. 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred when it summarily denied post conviction relief 
without considering the record which established Petitioner's claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, or, in the alternative, Petitioner is entitled to post 
conviction relief since his attorney failed to move to withdraw his guilty plea when 
he did not receive probation despite the court's express advice that he could. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT SUMMARILY DENIED POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE RECORD WHICH 
ESTABLISHED PETITIONER'S CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF SINCE HIS ATTORNEY FAILED TO MOVE TO 
WITHDRAW HIS GUil TY PLEA WHEN HE DID NOT RECEIVE PROBATION 
DESPITE THE COURT'S EXPRESS ADVICE THAT HE COULD 
A. Standard of Review at Trial and on Appeal 
An application for post-conviction relief under Idaho Code § 19-4901 is 
civil in nature and is an entirely new proceeding distinct from the criminal action 
which led to the conviction. Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494 (Ct.App. 1994). In 
order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the applicant must prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations upon which the request for post-
conviction relief is based. Id. 
Summary disposition is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment 
under I.R.C.P. 56, with the facts construed and all reasonable inferences made in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 
759 (Ct.App. 1991 ). Allegations contained in the verified petition are deemed 
true for the purpose of determining whether an evidentiary hearing should be 
held. Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844 (Ct.App. 1994). If the allegations do not 
frame a genuine issue of material fact, the court may grant a motion to summarily 
dismiss, but if the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must 
conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id. 
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In determining whether a motion for summary disposition was properly 
granted, the appellate court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to 
petitioner and determines whether, if true, they would entitle petitioner to relief. 
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319 (1995). 
B. Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel 
The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
well established, being set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). The "benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be 
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result." Id. at 686. 
Strickland set forth a two-prong test which a defendant must satisfy in 
order to be entitled to relief. The defendant must demonstrate both that his 
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of 
the proceedings would have been different. Id. at 687-88; State v. Charboneau, 
116 Idaho 129 (1989); Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986). 
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C. Petitioner's Claims, the Change of Plea Hearing, and the Court's Rulings 
As mentioned above, the amended petition just concisely stated what 
Petitioner had alleged in his 28-page pro se motion and supporting affidavit. 
The amended petition summarized the grounds as follows: 
5. Post Conviction conflicts appointed counsel [sic} as reviewed 
petitioner's grounds for post conviction relief and concisely stated 
they are: 
a. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel by: 
(i) Failure to file a Motion to Suppress statements made to the 
police during interrogation at police station without counsel 
present. 
(ii) Failure to adequately object to or move to exclude using 
evidence of prior convictions at trial. 
(iii) Failure to move to withdraw petitioner's guilty plea, pursuant 
to I.C.R. 11, after petitioner was denied admittance into Mental 
Health Court. 
(iv) Failure to adequately explain the entirety of the plea 
agreement and what would happen if petitioner was denied 
entrance into Mental Health Court. 
(v) Failure to move to withdraw petitioner's guilty plea, pursuant 
to I.C.R. 11, after the court relinquished iurisdiction at the rider 
review hearing. 
(vi) Failure to adequately investigate witnesses and exculpatory 
evidence. 
(vii) Failure to investigate petitioner's mental competence. 
Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief, p. 1-2 (emphasis added). (R. p. 77-
78.) 
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Appellant here only challenges the rulings related to the claims concerning 
the plea agreement, to wit, (iii) - (v), above.3 
While the pro se petition is hardly a model of clarity, Mr. Maschek did 
provide support for the heart of the matter, citing to and quoting from the change 
of plea hearing where the court stated that since the matter is presented to it as a 
Rule 11 plea agreement, it will honor the recommendation of the state to place 
him on probation and that if something comes up which changes the court's 
mind, it would allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. (R. p. 22.) 
As necessary background to this issue, the following is contained in our 
record. First, as to the plea agreement, a one page form written plea agreement 
was used and provided as follows in relevant part: Under the section entitled 
Jail/Prison terms: "4 years determinate plus 4 years indeterminate, for a total of 
8 years, suspended, see terms below." Under the section entitled Terms of 
Probation: "4 years supervised, Mental Health Court (MHC), 90 days jail to 
serve, no objection to release for verified education/employment/treatment." 
(Offer-Plea Agreement, Exhibit on appeal.) 
Under the section entitled Special Terms: 'The state will not object to an 
Alford plea. Defendant to meaningfully participate in and comply with the 
requirements of Mental Health Court (MHC). Probation period shall continue 
3 As an aside, the state first argued that the entire petition should be dismissed 
because it was unsupported since appointed counsel's amended petition 
contained no affidavit and failed to incorporate the pro se petition's affidavit. (Tr. 
p. 12/6/2010, p. 6.) The court nevertheless considered the facts and claims 
raised in the original pro se verified petition. (Tr. 12/6/2010, p. 16.) However, 
while specifically arguing the grounds at issue here, the state did not bring up the 
lack of support, presumably because they were based on the underlying criminal 
case record of which the court took judicial notice. (Tr. 12/6/2010, p. 8-9.) 
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following the successful completion of MHC for supervision up to the total four 
years or until restitution is paid. Unsuccessful discharge from Mental Health 
Court is a violation of the terms of probation which may subject the defendant to 
the imposition of his sentence. If the defendant is not accepted into MHC, the 
state will limit itself to a period of retained jurisdiction, not actual penitentiary time 
to be served." (Offer-Plea Agreement, Exhibit on Appeal.) 
Next, two portions of the change of plea hearing are relevant here. At 
first, the court stated: 
THE COURT: That commitment [of the state] is this: That if you 
plead guilty to the charge this morning, the state will be 
recommending to the court a unified sentence of eight years, 
consisting of four years fixed, four years indeterminate. What that 
means is that should that sentence ever be imposed, you would 
have to serve a minimum of four years in the Idaho State 
Penitentiary before you would be eligible for parole. After that, 
during the second four year portion, parole would be up to the 
parole board. 
Do you understand that that's the consequence or the meaning of 
that sentence? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: The state is going to recommend that that sentence 
be suspended and that you will, as a condition of probation, 
participate in the mental health court program here in Twin Falls. 
I'm assuming that Mr. Williams has explained in some detail what 
that means? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that there are some hoops that 
you have to go through before you can be considered for mental 
health court? In other words, you have to be evaluated by the 
mental health court staff, you have to meet the diagnosis 
qualifications, that I don't have anything to do with that. In other 
words, I certainly will follow these-I've told your counsel I will 
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follow these recommendations and ask that you be put in mental 
health court, but I cannot control that. If for some reason you don't 
qualify, then what happens is you come back before me for 
sentencing and we look at some alternatives. Do you understand 
that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes sir. 
THE COURT: So there is a little bit of a gamble, if you will, to you. 
Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And if you're not allowed to get into mental health 
court, your plea in the case will still stand; in other words, you can't 
withdraw it. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
Transcript of Change of Plea hearing, 8/7/2008, p. 3, In. 19-p. 5, In. 18 
(emphasis added). (Exhibit on appeal.) 
Shortly thereafter the court gave the following advice: 
The charge of conspiracy to commit first degree arson carries a 
potential penalty of 25 years in the Idaho State Penitentiary and a 
$100,000 fine. Do you understand that those are the maximum 
penalties that you face? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And that if it became necessary to actually sentence 
you in this case because you were not accepted into mental health 
court-well, let me rephrase it this way. Do you understand that's 
the maximum penalty that could be imposed in this case? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Again, I have told your attorneys, pursuant to a 
chambers conference that we had yesterday, that since this matter 
is presented to me as a Rule 11 plea agreement that I will honor 
the recommendations of the state to place you on probation. Do 
you understand that if for some reason something would come up 
and I would change my mind about that, that I would allow you to 
withdraw your plea of guilty? Do you understand that? 
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
Transcript of Change of Plea hearing, 8/7/2008, p. 8, In. 14-p. 9, In. 10. 
In its brief in support of its motion for summary disposition, the state 
argued, inter alia, since Mr. Maschek had no basis to withdraw his plea, it was 
not ineffective assistance of counsel to not seek to do so. (R. p. 94.) The brief 
continued by stating "[j]n fact, the petitioner knows he is not entitled to this relief 
as set forth in the record." (R p. 94.) The state then quoted from the first portion 
of the change of plea hearing detailed above where the court at first advised that 
if Mr. Maschek is not allowed into mental health court he cannot withdraw his 
guilty plea. (R. p. 95.) However the state never mentioned the later advice that 
he could withdraw his guilty plea if the court was not going to impose probation. 
Nor did the state acknowledge that the pro se petition actually cited to and 
quoted from the relevant portion of the change of plea hearing. 
The next claim addressed was that Mr. Maschek's attorney failed to 
adequately explain the entirety of the plea agreement and what would happen if 
Petitioner were denied entrance into Mental Health Court. The state argued, 
inter alia, that the court discussed this with Mr. Maschek and referred to its earlier 
recitation of the change of plea hearing. (R. p. 96.) The state again failed to 
provide or cite to the second portion of the change of plea hearing where the 
court advised Mr. Maschek that he could withdraw his plea if he was not going to 
be placed on probation. 
Finally, the state discussed the third of the inter-related grounds 
concerning the plea, to wit, that Mr. Maschek's counsel was ineffective for failing 
12 
to move to withdraw the guilty plea pursuant to I .C.R. 11 after the court 
relinquished jurisdiction. The state argued that Petitioner had both failed to 
present evidence to establish his right to withdraw his guilty plea and failed to 
indicate the grounds therefore. The state concluded that therefore, the court 
cannot evaluate whether his attorney was ineffective, so this allegation must be 
denied. (R. p. 96.) Once more, the state failed to refer to the portion of the 
change of plea hearing which established both the right and the grounds, to wit, 
that the court was treating the guilty plea as a Rule 11 agreement and that Mr. 
Maschek could withdraw it if he was not going to be placed on probation (which 
happened when jurisdiction was relinquished). 
At the motion hearing, the post conviction court granted the state's motion 
for summary dismissal in its entirety. On the claims at issue here, the court's 
rulings were as follows: 
Next, Mr. Maschek claims that the failure to move to withdraw his 
guilty plea after he was denied entrance into Mental Health Court is 
defective. The transcript of the change of plea, [sic] which was 
before me, establishes that Maschek pied guilty, knowing that if he 
was not accepted, the agreement required-and that is his plea 
agreement and contract with the state-required that he proceed to 
sentencing, with the state limited to a rider recommendation. Once 
his acceptance into Mental Health Court was denied, then, by the 
clear terms of his plea agreement, he had no right to seek 
withdrawal and, thus, as a matter of law, there is no showing that 
counsel is deficient for failing to seek to violate the plea agreement; 
nor is there evidence that such a request would have been granted 
in any event on the prejudice prong, particularly where Judge 
Stoker informed Mr. Maschek at the change of plea hearing that if 
he were not accepted into Mental Health Court, and I quote from 
the transcript, "If you're not allowed to get into Mental Health Court, 
your plea in this case will stand. In other words, you can't withdraw 
it," end of quote. Therefore I conclude there's no showing that any 
likelihood of prevailing on such a motion would have been granted 
by Judge Stoker; and that count is, therefore, dismissed. 
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The next claim is a failure to adequately explain the entirety of the 
plea agreement and what would happen if Maschek was denied 
entrance into Mental Health Court. Again, there are no facts to 
support these allegations; and in fact, it is specially disproved by 
the record. The offer/plea agreement sets forth that Maschek had 
read the offer, that he understood it, and that he accepted the offer 
on its stated terms. 
As I've already noted, a term of the plea offer was that if Maschek 
was not accepted into Mental Health Court, the state would limit 
itself to a period of retained jurisdiction. 
Also, the change of plea advisory form sets forth that Maschek had 
discussed all the ramifications of his case with his lawyer and had 
discussed fully with his lawyer the nature of the charge and 
Maschek's constitutional rights and defenses to the charge, 
including the possible consequences. As such, the allegation is 
disproved by the record and is dismissed. 
Next, failure to move to withdraw Maschek's plea after the trial 
court relinquished jurisdiction, again, there are no facts asserted as 
to what Maschek would have argued to establish the significant 
burden at that point in the proceeding to support a withdrawal of his 
guilty plea. 
Criminal Rule 33(c) sets forth that a motion to withdraw a plea of 
guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition 
of sentence is suspended. But to correct manifest injustice, the 
court, after sentence, may set aside the judgment of conviction and 
permit the defendant to withdraw the defendant's plea, end of 
quote. 
The record is absolutely devoid of any fact establishing any 
manifest injustice in this case which would have been sufficient to 
support Maschek's withdrawal of a guilty plea well after judgment 
was pronounced and sentence imposed. 
Transcript, 12/6/2010,,p. 18, In. 12-p. 21, In. 7.4 
4 The court's comment about "the transcript of the change of plea, which was 
before me," makes no sense. The post conviction judge did not preside over the 
change of plea hearing, and if it was referring to the transcript itself being before 
the court, the verb tense is incorrect. 
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D. The Court Erred in Summarily Denying the Petition or, in the Alternative, 
Mr. Maschek is Entitled to Post Conviction Relief 
As detailed above, the court at the change of plea hearing advised Mr. 
Maschek that if he was not accepted into Mental Health Court he could not 
withdraw his guilty plea, and then later advised him that if something were to 
happen so as he would not be placed on probation, he could withdraw his guilty 
plea. This in itself shows that the post conviction court erred when summarily 
dismissing the guilty plea claims because the post conviction court failed to even 
acknowledge, much less consider, all of the criminal court's advice to Mr. 
Maschek. Presumably, the post conviction court did not read the entire transcript 
of the change of plea hearing, but just relied on the state's misleading version of 
it appearing in its brief. 
Obviously, had the court considered the entire transcript, it would not have 
made the sweeping statements such as the record being absolutely devoid of 
any fact establishing Mr. Maschek could meet the withdrawal of plea burden and 
that there was no showing of any likelihood of prevailing on a motion to withdraw 
guilty plea before the criminal court. The criminal court expressly telling Mr. 
Maschek it was treating the guilty plea as a Rule 11 agreement and that he could 
withdraw his guilty plea if he was not placed on probation, along with the fact he 
was not placed on probation, constitutes evidence supporting a motion to 
withdraw guilty plea and also shows a likelihood that the criminal court would 
have granted it. Thus, the post conviction court's factual findings were clearly 
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erroneous because they did not reflect what the record shows actually happened. 
In short, it was error for the post conviction court to fail to consider the evidence 
supporting Mr. Maschek's claims and then to dismiss them because it claimed 
they were unsupported by the evidence. 
Further, since the factual findings were erroneous, the post conviction 
court's conclusions of law which relied on them were erroneous as well. Given 
that the facts and reasonable inferences therefrom must be constructed in favor 
of Petitioner, the second statement of the criminal court at the change of plea 
hearing is enough in itself to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
whether Mr. Maschek could withdraw his guilty plea and, therefore, whether 
counsel was ineffective for failing to do so. 
The stage of the proceedings must be considered, this was a motion for 
summary dismissal. Even had the state urged a different interpretation of the 
statement rather than omitting it, since the record establishes that the criminal 
court directly told Mr. Maschek he could withdraw his plea if the court were not 
going to place him on probation, summary dismissal was inappropriate and an 
evidentiary hearing was required. 
To summarize, Appellant asserts that the dismissal of the claims related to 
the plea of guilty and the withdrawal of same must be reversed for the procedural 
error reasons discussed above. However, Appellant will nevertheless go forth 
and discuss the merits as well. 
As an initial matter, Appellant asserts that the record shows that Mr. 
Maschek is entitled to relief as a matter of law because the criminal court told him 
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he could withdraw his guilty plea if he was not placed on probation. Even 
assuming arguendo this was inconsistent with the court's earlier statement 
(discussed further below), a litigant should be entitled to trust the oral 
pronouncements of district judges. Therefore, this Court should simply remand 
for the post conviction court to grant post conviction relief because this claim is 
established and an evidentiary hearing is actually not required to grant relief. 
The Ninth Circuit has decided an analogous case, which although not 
controlling, is nevertheless instructive. In United States v. Buchanan, 59 F.3d 914 
(9th Cir. 1995), the defendant waived his right to appeal his sentence in his plea 
agreement, so long as the sentence was within the applicable Sentencing 
Guidelines Range. Despite the waiver clause in Buchanan's plea agreement, the 
district court judge explicitly informed Buchanan during his sentencing hearing 
that he had a right to appeal his sentence within ten days. Buchanan indicated 
that he understood the judge's statements. Furthermore the government did not 
object to the district court's erroneous statements regarding the right to appeal. 
The Ninth Circuit held that because of the court's statements, Buchanan 
could have a reasonable expectation that he could appeal his sentence . 
. . . here, the oral pronouncement must control. The district court 
twice stated that Buchanan had a right to appeal his sentence. 
Indeed, Buchanan's answer of "Yes, sir" to the district court's 
question of whether he understood that he had a right to appeal 
indicates Buchanan's expectation that he could appeal his sentence 
and evinces a misunderstanding of the substance of his plea 
agreement. We note also that the government did not object to the 
district court's erroneous statements. Thus, Buchanan could have 
no reason but to believe that the court's advice on the right to 
appeal was correct. 
Litigants need to be able to trust the oral pronouncements of district 
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court judges. Given the district court judge's clear statements at 
sentencing, the defendant's assertion of understanding, and the 
prosecution's failure to object, we hold that in these circumstances, 
the district court's oral pronouncement controls and the plea 
agreement waiver is not enforceable. 
Id. at p. 918 (emphasis added). 
So, according to Buchanan, it does not matter that the district court was 
wrong in its advice, a litigant can rely on what he is told by the court. In our case, 
the judge clearly advised Mr. Maschek that if anything changed its mind about 
placing him on probation, he would be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. When 
asked if he understood, Mr. Maschek said "Yes, sir" Uust like in Buchanan), 
which showed his misunderstanding of the substance of the plea agreement. 
Significantly, this was the last word on the subject, so even if the earlier advice 
was contrary, it was superseded by the new and more complete explanation, to 
wit, that the court was treating the plea as a Rule 11 plea agreement. 
Further, when the court advised Mr. Maschek that he could withdraw his 
guilty plea, the state remained silent and did not object or correct the court by 
explaining what it now claims, which is that he actually had no right to withdraw 
his plea agreement. Given all this, just like in Buchanan, Mr. Maschek would 
have had no reason to believe that the court was not correctly telling him that he 
could withdraw his guilty plea if he was not placed on probation. 
Appellant asserts that in the Idaho state courts as well as the federal 
courts, litigants must be able to trust the oral pronouncements of judges. In other 
words, Appellant asserts that in order to maintain the integrity of the justice 
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system, a litigant must be able to trust the promise of a judge, regardless of 
whether that promise should have been made or not. 
Even if this Court were to hold that Mr. Maschek could not trust the 
promise of the criminal court, he is nevertheless still entitled to relief on the 
merits. Contrary to the argument of the state and ruling of the post conviction 
court that there was no basis for Mr. Maschek to withdraw his guilty plea prior to 
being sent on a rider, Appellant asserts that the basis is obvious from the record. 
In short, the record shows that the court never adequately explained the 
consequences of his guilty plea in violation of I.C.R. 11. In other words, given the 
failure of the court at the change of plea hearing (and the plea agreement) to 
advise that he could be sent on a rider but not be placed on probation afterward, 
Mr. Maschek was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea after he was denied 
admittance to the Mental Health Court. 
First, the plea agreement drafted by the state (and so construed against it) 
is oddly worded. It does not, as interpreted by the post conviction court, state 
that the prosecutor will limit its sentencing recommendation to a rider. It actually 
provides that the "state will limit itself to a period of retained jurisdiction, not 
actual penitentiary time to be served." (Offer-Plea Agreement, Exhibit on Appeal.) 
What this would sound like to a defendant (as opposed to the bench and 
bar), is that if he is denied entrance to the Mental Health Court program, he 
would be sent on a rider (for treatment and/or punishment purposes) and then 
placed on probation, as opposed to being sent on a rider for evaluation purposes 
after which he may or may not be· placed on probation and thus may be sent to 
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the penitentiary. This belief would be furthered by the other language in the plea 
agreement. The only situation discussed in the plea agreement where Mr. 
Maschek's sentence may be imposed was for a violation of his terms of probation 
by unsuccessful discharge from the Mental Health Court, which is clearly 
different from a failure to be admitted because that was addressed in the next 
sentence. 
Significantly, the criminal court said nothing that would disabuse this 
understanding at the change of plea hearing because it never advised the 
defendant of the circumstances in which his sentence could be imposed. In the 
initial advice, the court did not even say that he would be placed on a rider, after 
which he could be flopped, if he was denied admittance into Mental Health Court. 
Rather, what the court said is "[i]f for some reason you don't quality, then what 
happens is you come back before me for sentencing and we look at some 
alternatives." The court then went on to say there was a little bit of a gamble, but 
never said the stakes were imposition of the eight year prison sentence.5 
As detailed above, in its second round of advice to Mr. Maschek, the court 
began to explain the possible consequences if he were not admitted into Mental 
Health Court, but never finished. Instead, it changed direction and told him he 
could withdraw his guilty plea if it was not going to place him on probation. The 
court stated: 
5 Appellant asserts that the court also minimized as a little gamble something that 
was more of a sure thing; that one who should be in mental health court but 
nevertheless cannot be admitted is unlikely to successfully complete a rider and 
so will have jurisdiction relinquished. 
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THE COURT: And that if it became necessary to actually sentence 
you in this case because you were not accepted into mental health 
court-well, let me rephrase it this way. Do you understand that's 
the maximum penalty that could be imposed in this case? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Again, I have told your attorneys, pursuant to a 
chambers conference that we had yesterday, that since this matter 
is presented to me as a Rule 11 plea agreement that I will honor 
the recommendations of the state to place you on probation. Do 
you understand that if for some reason something would come up 
and I would change my mind about that, that I would allow you to 
withdraw your plea of guilty? Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
Transcript of Change of Plea hearing, 8/7/2008, p. 8, In. 20-p. 9, In. 10. 
So while Mr. Maschek was advised of the maximum penalty in the case if 
his sentence was imposed, he was never told the circumstances under which it 
could be imposed, to wit, if he was denied admittance into Mental Health Court 
and also flopped his rider. Instead, he was told that if he was not going to get 
probation, he could withdraw his guilty plea. In short, since the court did not 
comply with I.C.R. Rule 11, there were valid grounds for a motion to withdraw 
prior to sentencing, and counsel was ineffective for failing to bring that motion. 
Next, assuming arguendo that Mr. Maschek was not for any reason 
entitled to withdraw his guilty plea prior to being sent on a rider, he still was 
entitled to withdraw it when the court decided to relinquish jurisdiction. This is 
because the two apparently contrary statements of the criminal court can actually 
be reconciled. 
While the first statement of the criminal court advised that if he was not 
admitted into Mental Health Court he could not withdraw his guilty plea, the 
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second statement advised that if the court was not going to place him on 
probation, it would allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. Thus, Mr. Maschek 
could withdraw his plea after his rider when jurisdiction was relinquished, 
because it was at that point that something had come up which made the court 
change its mind about placing him on probation. 
Alternatively, Appellant asserts that if for some reason Mr. Maschek 
actually could not withdraw his guilty plea, he nevertheless is still entitled to relief. 
Mr. Maschek also asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 
because his attorney failed to explain the plea agreement in its entirety and did 
not explain the consequences if he was denied admittance into Mental Health 
Court. There is undisputed evidence of this because the claim is not, as argued 
by the state and found by the post conviction court, that he was unaware that the 
state would recommend a rider. Rather, the claim is that he did not understand 
that he could be sent to prison after his rider because he was not advised of this 
by his attorney, the plea agreement, or the court. 6 
Finally, Appellant will point out that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals just 
recently decided a case where a prosecutor also misrepresented the record. 
While again, although not controlling, it is strikingly similar to ours and so again is 
instructive. In United States v. Lopez-Avila,_ F.3d _, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 
624, (9th Cir. 1/12/2012), the Ninth Circuit succinctly explained the background as 
follows: 
6 Contrary to the conclusion of the post conviction court, the fact that he read and 
signed the plea agreement which did not explain this cannot defeat this claim. 
Nor can the representation that he discussed the consequences of the plea with 
his attorney since those consequences were not detailed. 
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On the second day of trial in this drug trafficking prosecution, during 
the cross-examination of Defendant-Appellant Aurora Lopez-Avila, 
the prosecutor read back supposed testimony of Lopez-Avila from 
her earlier change of plea hearing. What he read back seemed to 
contradict Lopez-Avila's earlier statements on direct examination. 
Using this supposed prior testimony, the prosecutor-Assistant 
U.S. Attorney (AUSA) Jerry R Albert, of the U.S. Attorney's Office 
for the District of Arizona-accused Lopez-Avila of having lied to 
the federal magistrate presiding at an earlier hearing. 
But the prosecutor's quotation was only part of what he represented 
was a question asked the defendant under oath by the magistrate 
judge. It was a half-truth. Without telling the court or defense 
counsel, the prosecutor presented to court and counsel an altered 
version of the prior hearing's question and answer, and the altered 
version of such dialogue made it appear as though Lopez-Avila had 
contradicted herself on a material point, when she plainly had not. 
The district court naturally assumed the prosecutor had read the 
question and answer whole, and allowed the questioning to 
proceed. When the prosecutor's misrepresentation was discovered 
by defense counsel, he moved for a mistrial, which the court swiftly 
granted. The defense then moved to dismiss the indictment with 
prejudice, on double jeopardy grounds, but the district court denied 
that motion. Lopez-Avila's appeal from the denial of that motion is 
the legal issue before us. 
Id. 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 624, p. 1-2. 
After affirming the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss based on 
the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Ninth Circuit went on to discuss the 
prosecutor's misconduct: 
We must note, however, that our conclusion on the double 
jeopardy question may not be the end of this matter. AUSA Jerry 
Albert represented to the trial court an altered version of the 
dialogue between the court and a witness at a hearing which had 
taken place in that same federal court. He presented a falsified 
version of an exchange as the true recitation of the transcript, until 
caught out by defense counsel. He did so to make it seem to the 
jury as if Lopez-Avila had lied under oath about being threatened to 
commit the cocaine possession crime, when she had plainly 
responded to a magistrate judge's question about whether she had 
been threatened to enter a plea of guilty. It is hard to see-and, 
from our vantage point as an appellate tribunal, we do not see-
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how a prosecutor could interpret a magistrate's question, "Has 
anyone threatened you or forced you to plead guilty?", asked at a 
run-of-the-mill guilty plea hearing, to mean "Has anyone threatened 
you to commit this offense or forced you to plead guilty?" 
After the mistrial was granted, AUSA Albert maintained that his 
reading was plausible. Perhaps Albert truly thought this, or perhaps 
he thought that consistently maintaining this position would 
minimize the possibility of any potential sanctions against him. We 
have no way of knowing, as it is not our task to conduct a thorough 
investigation of Albert's conduct for disciplinary purposes. We do 
note that Albert's name does not appear on the prosecution's brief 
in our court, and he did not appear at oral argument before us. But 
whatever Albert's motivation, it is worth reminding him and all 
federal prosecutors of Justice Sutherland's famous statement that 
the dual obligation of a federal prosecutor in our justice system is to 
strike hard blows but to refrain from striking foul ones; to use 
legitimate means to attempt to secure a conviction without 
employing improper methods to do so. Berger v. United States, 295 
U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 79 L. Ed. 1314 (1935). 
We recognize that this court is not the proper venue for direct 
discipline of Albert, so we will not state here that the blow struck by 
Albert necessarily was one so foul as to require some form of 
sanction. We were not in district court to see what occurred; Albert 
has not appeared before us to explain himself; and this appeal is 
not directly about his misconduct, but rather about the question 
whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a new prosecution. We 
are, however, in a position to do three things to address the 
potential misconduct: remand the case to allow the district court to 
consider dismissal with prejudice of the indictment as an exercise 
of its supervisory powers and to prevent other misconduct in the 
future; instruct the district court to consider disciplinary options also 
pursuant to its supervisory powers; and note that the Office of 
Professional Responsibility within the Department of Justice has 
the responsibility of investigating allegations of misconduct by 
federal prosecutors. 
Id., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 624, p. 18-21. 
In our case, the prosecutor in the post conviction case also 
misrepresented the record by only advising the court of some of what happened 
at the change of plea hearing. By making arguments about what happened at 
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the change of plea hearing while presenting only a portion of the criminal court's 
advice to the defendant, the prosecutor presented an altered version of what had 
happened below. This made it look like Mr. Maschek had only been told he 
could not withdraw his guilty plea, rather that the complete version, which is he 
was also told that he could. Unfortunately, the post conviction court, believing 
that the state was accurately portraying the record, simply relied on it. 
What we do not know is whether the prosecutor's omission of a relevant 
portion of the change of plea hearing was due to negligence or was an intentional 
misrepresentation. But just like in the case above, it is hard to see how the 
prosecutor could have missed the next page of the transcript, particularly since 
Mr. Maschek had quoted the pertinent language in his pro se petition, or saw it 
but omitted it believing somehow that the post conviction court should not be 
made aware of the criminal court's statements directly supporting Petitioner's 
claims. 
In the event that this Court finds Appellant's arguments persuasive, either 
as to the procedural error but particularity if on the merits, then the state's 
misrepresentation has clearly prejudiced Mr. Maschek, since the hearing on the 
motion for summary dismissal was held on December 6, 2010. While this Court 
may well not be the correct venue for determining if the misrepresentation was 
intentional or not, mitigation of any further delay resulting from it is nevertheless 
appropriate. In other words, had the prosecutor presented the complete version 
of what happened at the change of plea hearing, the post conviction court could 
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have granted relief, so Appellant requests that this Court simply remand for entry 
of post conviction relief to avoid any further prejudicial delay. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, for the reasons as stated above, Appellant/Petitioner 
respectfully requests that the district court's summary denial of the post 
conviction petition be reversed and that this matter be remanded for entry of post 
conviction relief by vacating the conviction, or, in the alternative, remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
DATED thi~ne'~ay of February, 2012. 
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